ABSTRACT: This paper describes the evolution of long-term debt and equity finance in medieval and early modern Europe. The main issuers of long-term debt were landowners and municipalities. The paper discusses the evolution of debt secured by land and the use by municipal borrowers of annuities and 'funded debt' (securitization). The paper then describes the various forms of equity finance and how they addressed the corporate governance problem.
of the twelfth century, the mortgage was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory to both parties, providing them with poor legal protection, and it largely fell out of use.
The instrument that replaced the mortgage was the sale of rents. 8 This instrument, which originated in Northern France in the twelfth century, evolved from the feudal custom of creating a rent-charge or cens on land-a formal obligation to pay a stated annuity, in produce or in money, out of the income of a specified property. An annuity might be for the life of the beneficiary or perpetual and heritable. Originally, a lord might have received a cens from a vassal in return for a fief. Or a landowner might have granted a cens to an heir as a legacy or to a retainer as a pension. But the instrument was readily adapted to other uses. For example, rather than selling land for cash, it could be sold in exchange for a rent constituted on it-a bail à rente or rent-sale. Or, rents could be made the basis for a loan: a lord could assign rents due him from his vassals to a third party in exchange for a capital sum, or he could constitute a rent on his land and sell this in exchange for a capital sum.
Viewed as a sale rather than a loan, the sale of rents (rente or census) was not considered usurious: the annuity was seen as a payment for a permanent and irrevocable transfer of capital and not as interest, which was a reward for a temporary and revocable one. Because it was considered a sale rather than a loan, the creditor had less difficulty in seizing the property on which the annuity was drawn in case of default. The term of the annuity was either for the life of the buyer (or sometimes the seller) or perpetual and heritable. While rates on perpetual annuities were significantly lower, rates on life annuities did not vary with the age or sex of the beneficiary (mortality statistics began to influence annuity rates only in the seventeenth century). Initially, only some contracts included a right of redemption-at the option of buyer, of seller, or either. However, by the late Middle Ages, annuities, especially perpetual annuities, generally gave the seller the right of redemption. 9 Annuities were transferable in principle, but in practice the procedure was cumbersome, and there was no organized secondary market for private annuities.
The existence of a well-organized market for rentes also had the effect of making real estate a more attractive asset. Land was one of the few investments available, but its lack seller. The papal bulls also required that the rente be constituted on a specific real property and that the annuity not exceed 10% of the capital invested.( Van der Wee (1977) ) 10 Van der Wee (1993) Ch10 11 Van der Wee (1977) Parker (1977) 12 "Improvement or renovation of farming and building of towns, the two basic sectors of local investment, were largely buttressed by credit via annuities. They brought long-term and medium-term credit within reach of the smaller businessmen in town and country. This penetration of investment credit within the smaller units of production of the local economy unquestionably helped to stimulate European expansion in the sixteenth century." (Van der Wee (1977) p305) 5 of liquidity was a major drawback. This was particularly a problem for merchants, who treasured liquidity above all else. However, the sale of rents provided a solution, enabling a merchant to move his capital into and out of land more or less at will. 16 Selling a rente enabled him to mobilize a part of the land's value as needed, without having to sell the whole thing-perhaps at a loss. By improving liquidity, the existence of the market for rentes made it more attractive for merchants to purchase land. As landowners, merchants made important contributions to increasing agricultural productivity: they were always alert to any opportunity for increasing the income from their estates. More generally, the sale of rents made real property a much more liquid asset: anyone who owned land or a house could borrow by constituting and selling a rent on it. 17
GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES
It did not take long for governments to notice the possibilities in this new instrument of credit. 18 The towns of Douai and Calais were the first to sell rentes in 1260, and they were soon followed by many others in the Low Countries and in the Rhineland. War was the main reason for issuing annuities-to finance the building of fortifications or to meet levies imposed on the towns by the territorial ruler. To sell rentes, of course, towns needed to have a regular cash flow on which they could be based. In their case, the source was not income on land but taxes-generally customs or excise taxes. Usually, lenders were given a prior claim on a specific sources of tax revenue. For example, in Amsterdam, collection of the excise taxes on beer, wine, and grain was contracted out each year to tax farmers. The latter, as part of the arrangement, were required to make payments on all outstanding annuities before passing on any excess to the authorities. 19 Annuities issued by towns were similar in structure to those issued by individuals, being either life annuities (on one or several lives) or perpetual redeemable annuities. Again, rates were higher on the former: German towns commonly paid 10% on life annuities and 5% on perpetual annuities. 20 To discourage fraud, some towns offered rewards for notification to the authorities of the death of a beneficiary of a life annuity. 21 Municipal annuities found a ready market. In the thirteenth century, the prosperous burghers of Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres (the drie steden) snapped up the issues of the smaller towns. 22 Annuities were so popular in Amsterdam in the sixteenth century, that the city limited subscription to a new issue in 1552 to £6 of annual income per beneficiary "so that everyone may be satisfied". 23 While the main purchasers were the wealthy, the middle classes could be drawn in during periods of prosperity: the Alderman's register in Antwerp in 1545 shows 25% of the purchasers to be craftsmen, 21% administrative officials, 17% widows, and 16% merchants. 24 The reason for the popularity of annuities was not only the general lack of good financial assets, but also their particular value as an insurance instrument. They were ideally structured to provide retirement income and to provide for widows and orphans. Municipal annuities were especially popular because of their greater safety and liquidity. Cities and towns rarely defaulted: municipal government was generally controlled by merchants, a group highly cognizant of the reputational cost of default. Moreover, all citizens or freemen of a city or town were jointly liable for its debts. Consequently, in the event of default, any merchant or property from the offending municipality could be seized for ransom. This recourse was available, of course, only to people living outside the town in question. As a result, municipal debt tended to be held by citizens of other towns, and investors generally avoided the debt of their own towns. To further protect themselves, investors diversified: one individual was recorded as receiving payment from 120 different issuers.
Municipal annuities were quite liquid. Like private annuities, they were transferable.
While in France this involved a complicated civil procedure, in the Low Countries, the procedure was relatively simple. The excellent credit of many municipalities made it easier to trade their debt: buyers could purchase it without investing a great deal of time and effort in ascertaining its value. During the fifteenth-century boom in municipal annuities, towns in the Low Countries established municipal banks to manage their debt.
These banks promoted sales of new issues both in the town and outside it, issued new securities against payment by the purchasers, and made the annual payments due the 21 Pirenne (1937) p 137 22 Nicholas (1971) 7 beneficiaries. 25 In the sixteenth century, the Stadtwechsel (public bank) of Basel played a similar role for many Swiss and foreign municipal annuities-a sort of general underwriter-charging issuers a fee of 2%. 26 The large size of some issues justified the expense of establishing an organized secondary market: there was an active market for municipal annuities in sixteenth-century Antwerp, brokered by the kassiers. The same kassiers also made a primary market, distributing new issues. 27 Territorial governments found it much harder than municipal governments to tap the market for annuities, because their credit was inferior. Government debt was essentially the personal debt of the prince. Like other nobles, a prince could sell rents on his personal or 'ordinary' income. This consisted mainly of income on his domains but it might also include traditional taxes and mining royalties. Princes were more constrained in their ability to impose taxes than municipalities: some sort of parliamentary consent was generally required and it was far from automatic. Therefore, for princes, tax revenue or 'extraordinary' income was less promising as a basis for annuities than they it was for municipalities. However, the greatest handicap for princes as borrowers was the lender's lack of legal recourse in case of default: a prince could not be sued in his own courts.
The counts and dukes of the Low Countries began to sell rents on their ordinary income in the fourteenth century and the kings of France and Castile began to do so in the fifteenth century. 28 Castile was a particularly big issuer of annuities, or juros , because its ordinary income was so substantial: it included a major excise tax, the alcabala, as well as the quinto real, a royalty of 20% on precious metals from the New World. Juros were a popular investment, especially among the nobility and clergy. When the Hapsburgs acquired Spain, they continued the practice of issuing annuities, and they did so in everincreasing quantities. By the 1550s, debt service approached and then exceeded 100% of ordinary income, and became increasingly dependent on the granting of extraordinary income by the Cortes (parliament). The increased risk made the juros considerably less attractive and created a demand on the part of purchasers to be able to dispose of them if conditions deteriorated. In response to this demand, juros were made transferable, and a 24 Van der Wee (1977) 25 Van der Wee (1990) . In the final third of the fifteenth century, the Burgundian wars led to escalating taxes and huge issues of annuities, resulting in financial crises in many of the towns and the collapse of most of the municipal banks.
26 Körner (1995) 27 Van der Wee (1993) 10 28 Much of the following is based on Tracy (1985) 8 secondary market soon developed. Selling at a discount in the secondary market, with consequently higher yields, the juros attracted a broader class of buyer. 29 Given their relatively poor access to the market, territorial governments sought ways to exploit or emulate the superior access enjoyed by the municipalities. One way was simply to have municipalities issue annuities in their own names and pass on the proceeds to the territorial ruler; the municipality received in exchange a tax imposed by the ruler that they could collect to pay the annuities. This was common practice for the Burgundian rulers of the Low Countries, and it was continued by their Hapsburg successors. Antwerp, in particular, became a large issuer of annuities to the benefit of Charles V, beginning in 1517. Another way for a prince to improve his standing in the annuities market was to make his debt less 'personal' by having it issued by parliament. As borrowers, parliaments had some of the same advantages as municipalities: they were permanent bodies rather than mortal individuals and they had the authority to impose new taxes. They were therefore more credible borrowers than princes and found it easier to issue long-term debt. From the fifteenth century, a number of German princes made over their revenues and their debts to their parliaments to be managed by them. The Hapsburgs, too, tried this approach-they were willing to try anything-and ceded taxes to the States (parliament) of the County of Holland, which issued annuities backed by them.
Beginning in 1542, there was a further refinement-the 'novel expedients'. The provincial States began to sell annuities based on taxes they themselves determined and collected rather than on existing taxes ceded to them by the ruler. The financial and fiscal apparatus they developed in the process proved invaluable to them in their revolt against the Hapsburgs later in the century. 30 Among territorial rulers, the king of France was at a serious disadvantage in the issuing of long-term debt. His ordinary income was relatively modest, and the French parliament, the Estates General, was so lacking in authority that it was useless as a debt intermediary. The king's only alternative was to rely instead on a municipality. From 1522, the king placed certain royal revenues from the Isle de France in the hands of the City of Paris as the basis for the sale of heritable annuities. These rentes sur l'hôtel de ville were well received by investors so long as they were issued in modest quantities.
However, when Henry II began to issue large amounts in the 1550s, investors balked and the burghers of Paris had to be coerced into buying them. During the civil war of religion 29 Muto (1995) 30 Tracy (1985) that broke out in 1572, enormous amounts were issued but as forced loans rather than as open-market sales.
ITALIAN FUNDED DEBT
The city-states of Italy relied for their borrowing on a financial instrument that differed from the annuities of Northern Europe. The basic institution was pioneered by Genoa. 31 Whenever the commune needed to finance a major expenditure, such as a war or colonization, it formed a syndicate (compera) of investors to provide the capital. Each investor contributed 100 lire and received in exchange one share (luoghe). To fund the interest and repayment, the commune vested in the compera ownership of a tax, usually created for the purpose. The earliest known compera, from 1164, had 11 shareholders and was constituted for a period of 11 years. More details are available for a later example, from 1432, when a compera securitas was formed to finance the building of a war fleet of twelve galleys. This compera was given control of a new excise tax of 0.5% imposed on maritime insurance contracts, that was to pay the promised 7% interest; luoghi were redeemable by the commune at 90% of par.
The compera is an early example of a financial structure known today as a securitization. A borrower sells specific receivables, for example automobile loans, to a specially-created 'pool' or 'special purpose vehicle'. The pool issues securities in its own name to fund the purchase (these securities are secured by title to the receivables). For a borrower with less than stellar general credit, but with a reliable flow of receivables, securitization can lower the cost of borrowing. The compera can also be seen as a variation on a common medieval institution-the tax farm. Governments often sold the right to collect a given tax for a specified time to a private individual. This allowed the government to capitalize the stream of future income (in much the same way as a sale of rents) and it also relieved it of the administrative burden of collecting the tax-for which it was generally ill-equipped. Normally, the tax farmer would fund the purchase out of his own capital. With a compera, however, the 'tax farm' was purchased with borrowed money, raised through the sale of shares.
Venice, Genoa's great rival, used a different procedure to finance its extraordinary expenditures. 32 Whenever it had an urgent need for funds, it would ask its leading citizens to contribute to a loan. The loan paid no interest, but it was repaid within a few years out of taxes specifically set aside for the purpose. This device-the interest-free loan-was a common recourse of medieval rulers: wealthy subjects often agreed to it, however uncertain repayment, preferring it to an outright tax. By 1200, however, voluntary loans could no longer keep up with Venice's growing needs and the city began to impose forced loans (prestiti or imprestiti). Citizens were required to subscribe a fixed percentage of their assessed wealth; a public assessor was appointed to determine the base for the tax (the estimo). These forced loans, too, were initially interest-free and they were repaid over a period of years. The Venetian forced loan was imitated by other citystates: Florence and Siena introduced the prestanze in the fourteenth century. Forced loans were generally backed by dedicated taxes, but lenders were often offered additional security. In Florence, the city's obligations were guaranteed 'by the lord Pope': this was not a surety but rather a promise to make the city pay. Siena, which unlike Florence was not on friendly terms with the pope, instead passed a law imposing heavy fines on officials if they so much as mentioned the possibility of diverting the dedicated taxes to any other purpose. 33 Generally, as new borrowing continued to grow, tax revenues proved insufficient to retire outstanding loans, and the debt effectively became perpetual. This change necessitated an adjustment in the terms. If there was to be no repayment, then there had to be interest: otherwise there was no difference between a loan and a tax. Usury was not an issue because the loans were not voluntary. If repayment was not to be the source of liquidity, then lenders needed to be able to sell their claims to others. Venice was the first to make these changes. In 1262, it consolidated all its outstanding debt in a single fund or Monte. 34 Claims on existing loans were exchanged for shares in the Monte, and subsequent forced loans were issued in the form of such shares. Shares in the Monte earned 5% interest, payable semiannually in March and September, and they were fully transferable. Transfer was easy, since shares existed only in book-entry form, recorded on the ledgers of the Camera degli Imprestiti. In 1343, Florence, unable to meet payments on its debt, followed the Venetian example and consolidated its outstanding debt in the Monte Commune on similar terms. 35 In 1407, the Genoese too recognized the advantages of consolidation and of ease of transfer and unified all their outstanding compere into a single entity, the Casa di San Giorgio. This continued to absorb additional compere until 1453, when it began to issue shares in its own name. All of the Monti were endowed with dedicated taxes to meet their obligations: that is, their obligations were 'funded'. The
The fundamental problem of equity finance is to ensure equity-holders a fair return on their investment. 48 Today, there exists a complex of institutional mechanisms to address this problem-accounting procedures and an accounting profession, legal protections, extensive reporting and analysis of financial information. Since none of these existed before 1600, equity finance had to rely on a simpler mechanism: wind up the business periodically, and divide up the proceeds among the shareholders. This procedure was possible, because business was largely commercial and did not require any substantial investment in fixed capital.
There were several types of equity finance, corresponding to different forms of business organization. The organizational form favored by commercial enterprise was the partnership-the single-voyage venture partnerships for maritime commerce; the longerlived continuing partnerships for overland trade and merchant banking. The form favored by shipowning and mining was the share company. We consider in turn the financing of each of these forms of business organization. 49
VENTURE PARTNERSHIPS 50
Until the fourteenth century, Italian maritime commerce relied for its financing largely on the venture partnership or commenda. In its standard form, the commenda was a contract between two persons: one provided labor, the other capital. The tractator provided the labor, traveling with the goods to trade; for this, he received one quarter of the profits. The stans or commendator remained at home but provided all the capital-in the form of trade goods or of money to purchase trade goods; for this he received three quarters of the profit. 51 The commenda was initially more a service contract than a financial contract. Typically, the stans was an established merchant, no longer required to risk his life at sea, and the tractator was a young man willing to accept the risks in order to make his name and build up capital of his own. Over time, however, the commenda was used increasingly as a way to mobilize funds. An established merchant, wishing to finance a trading venture, would do so by entering into commenda contracts with a number of investors. In such contracts, the merchant would be the tractator and the investor would be the stans, providing capital in the form of money (the merchant, rather than traveling himself, would send the goods to an agent overseas). Investors could diversify the risk by being party to many contracts with many different merchants. For example, the executors of a Genoese nobleman who died in 1240, Guglielmo de Castro, found the bulk of his assets invested in some two dozen separately notarized commenda contracts. 52 Merchants too could use the commenda to diversify: the same merchant who raised funds for his own ventures as a tractator would often, at the same time, invest part of his own capital as a stans with other merchants. 53 The term of the commenda was normally for a single venture: the voyage rarely took more than a year and often took only a few months. The contract could be, and frequently was, rolled over to finance subsequent ventures. This provided good incentives for performance by the tractator. In its earlier, service-contract, days, the commenda exposed the stans to liability for the actions of the tractator, who was regarded as his agent.
However, in its later financial version, the commenda provided investors-in practice, if not in theory-with limited liability: their liability was limited to the capital they put up.
Given the rather passive role of the investor, granting him the standard three quarters of the profits due the stans might seem overly generous. In practice, this was less generous than it might seem, since the calculation of the amount of profit was in the hands of the tractator. Initially, the tractator was obliged to make some formal accounting, but as the instrument matured, investors normally agreed to accept the word of the tractator "without an oath or witness". 54 Indeed, as use of the instrument became more routine, and as it was used for progressively less risky enterprises, it became more debt-like: in many cases, the rate of profit was fixed in advance, independent of the outcome of the venture in question.
The use of the commenda as a financial instrument reached its highest degree of development in Venice, where it was known as the collegantia or colleganza. Thousands of investors from all walks of life-from retired merchants to monks, from housewives to parish priests-financed much of Venice's trade through their investment in colleganza contracts. The amount of each contract was relatively small-from 10 ducats to 500 ducats. It was initially customary for the tractator to provide one third of the capital (in exchange for half of the profit). However, as investor confidence grew this requirement 52 Spufford (1988) 53 de Roover (1945) 54 Lopez (1976) p 76 fell into abeyance, allowing merchants to operate with sums greatly in excess of their own capital. 55 Consequent abuses led the authorities in 1324 to prohibit any merchant from carrying overseas on colleganza an amount of goods that exceeded the value of his personal wealth as assessed by the estimo. The popularity of the colleganza grew during the thirteenth century, and by the early fourteenth it was being used to finance all sorts of non-venture enterprises. Borrowers on these so-called 'local colleganza' contracts included shopkeepers, artisans, and deposit banks. Maturity became standardized-mostly for one year. The 'profit' was generally indexed to some market rate prevalent at the time of maturity (often the rate on depositi a discrezione paid by leading merchants or bankers). The popularity of the colleganza waned during the fourteenth century.
Maritime trade became more routine and was increasingly taken over by large companies with agents overseas, and the availability of marine insurance allowed them to finance their operations at lower cost with bills of exchange. However, the riskiest ventures, such as an expedition to India, continued to be financed with colleganza contracts. At the same time, investors increasingly found an alternative outlet for their funds in the market for government debt. 56
CONTINUING PARTNERSHIPS
The large, permanent companies that replaced the traveling merchant used a different form of organization-the continuing partnership or compagnia. This had evolved during the twelfth century as a more flexible version of the Greco-Roman societas-a legal structure that allowed a number of individuals to pool capital and labor in order to share the risks and profits of an ongoing enterprise. The duration of the partnership was limited but indefinite: a term of from two to twelve years was normal. 57 The purpose of closing the partnership was generally to distribute the profits (shares could be transferred without dissolving the partnership). Closing the partnership did not, however, mean the end of the business: the partnership was usually reconstituted immediately with many of the same partners Like the commenda, the compagnia served both organizational and financial functions. However, its value as a financial vehicle was limited by the joint and several liability of the partners: any partner, however small his capital investment in the enterprise, could be ruined by the actions of any other. In some cases, where the enterprise involved little risk, this was not a problem. Consequently, the compagnia, or some other arrangement much like it, was widely used as a way to obtain external finance for petty trade and manufacturing. 58 However, in international commerce and banking, where the risks were great, outside investors were unwilling to expose themselves to the chance of ruin. As a result, partners in the great trading and banking companies were generally related by blood or by marriage. Moreover, they usually were not passive investors: they either worked in the business or at least participated in major decisions to protect their interests. Because equity was not a viable means of mobilizing external finance for these companies, they generally relied more on debt. This usually meant depositi a discrezione. Although the deposito had an initial maturity of from six months to two years, investors typically allowed it to run on for much longer (it then became payable on demand), making it essentially a form of long-term debt. For the large merchant banks, such debt could be as much as ten times the firm's own capital. 59 The problem of unlimited liability was eventually solved through the creation of a new structure, the limited partnership or accomandita. This was first recognized by legislation in Florence in 1408. The accomandita distinguished between active and 'sleeping' partners. The status of active partners was much as it was under the compagnia. However, sleeping partners were treated as purely financial investors, and their liability was limited to the amount of capital they subscribed. To enjoy limited liability, the accomandita, unlike an ordinary partnership, was obliged to register with the Merchants' Court. Sleeping partners played no role in the day-to-day running of the business. However, since they usually contributed most of the capital (as much as 95%), they had the final say on major decisions, such as the selection of managers and the duration of the partnership. The initial term of the partnership was typically from three to five years, after which it could be renewed from year to year at the discretion of the partners. Sleeping partners were generally wealthy non-merchants. Since sleeping partners did not have to be named specifically on the document of association, the 58 "In town and country alike the commercial classes had made free use of the contract of partnership which enabled them to trade with borrowed capital, while avoiding the suspicion of unlawful practices." Tawney (1925) protection of anonymity made it easier for the nobility to invest in business without losing status (this was a major reason for the popularity of the accomandita in France).
Anonymity also made it easier for foreigners to invest, when such investment was restricted or prohibited by regulation. The accomandita also proved a useful way for large trading companies to invest in smaller companies that supplied them with manufactured goods. Because of these advantages, the accomandita gradually replaced the ordinary compagnia.
SHARE COMPANIES
Stimulated largely by the Crusades, Genoa saw a rapid expansion in its shipping business in the twelfth century. 60 Until then, ships had been small and had served mostly local trade; they had been owned and operated by mariners individually or in simple partnership. However, with the Crusades, the enormous expansion in demand, the growing size of ships, and the greater risks of long-distance trade, exceeded the financial capacity of mariner-owners. From 1150, it became increasingly common to finance the construction and operation of ships by dividing the ownership into shares or loca. 61 A number of investors would pool their resources, each purchasing a share. The number of shares, from 16 to 70, seems often to have corresponded to the number of mariners operating the ship: each shareholder was responsible for the expenses and wages of 'his' mariner. The duration of the agreement was usually a single voyage. Share ownership was registered with the ship's scribe, who was also responsible for accounting for the venture's revenues and expenses and for dividing the profits among the shareholders. Often shareholders were themselves active participants in the voyage, and those who were not generally placed their shares in the hands of others who were. One of the shareholders who sailed with the ship might be given command as patronus.
Alternatively, the owners might hire a ship's master-perhaps by means of a commenda contract. While the principal investors were merchants, loca became a popular investment for all classes. Families pooled their resources to purchase a share, and shares were subdivided, sometimes into quite small fractions. By the middle of the thirteenth century, banks too were investing in loca.
59 Braudel (1982) 60 The following relies largely on Byrne (1930) 61 The idea was not new: the locum maris has its origins in Classical antiquity.
The main difference between loca and partnerships was the ease with which the ownership of shares could be transferred. 62 A share-owner was able to dispose of a share, or part of it, without requiring the consent of others. Shares in ships of all types and sizes were traded, bequeathed, pledged, hypothecated, and given in commenda as freely as any other property. Shares were regularly pledged as security for loans raised to finance a voyage-to purchase trade goods and supplies and to pay the mariners' wages. Shares could also be used to finance construction of the ship, with builders accepting shares in lieu of payment.
Use of the locum began to decline in Italy from the middle of the thirteenth century.
To a large extent its popularity had derived from its ability to spread risk among many investors and to allow individual investors to diversify by purchasing shares in many different ships. By 1250, overseas trade had become more secure and the market for marine insurance had developed to the point that it offered an alternative way to manage risk. Moreover, some merchants had acquired fortunes sufficiently large that they could comfortably bear the risk of owning a ship-or even many ships.
Although share ownership in ships declined in importance, at least in Italy, the use of the share-company structure spread to other forms of enterprise and continued to thrive.
Share companies were set up to finance the construction of mills and to finance silver mining in Sardinia. Share companies, known as maone, were set up to finance trading colonies in Ceuta and Chios. In the fifteenth century, share companies were set up to mine and transport salt, alum, and mercury. And it seems reasonable to suppose that the share company provided the model for the compere used in public finance and for the Casa di San Giorgio.
The use of the share-company structure also spread geographically. The mines of Tuscany and of Central Europe were largely financed through share ownership. In Germany, silver and copper mines were financed with as many as 640 shares or Kuxen, often further subdivided. In addition to their initial subscription, shareholders were sometimes called upon to provide supplementary funds as the need arose. Kuxen became a popular investment in Germany: investors included not only merchants, but also local noblemen and clergy, municipal governments, and trusts.
In the fifteenth century, share ownership in shipping spread to the Netherlands, perhaps reaching there from the Hansa where the practice was widespread. 63 As had been the case in Genoa earlier, the growth of share finance in Dutch shipping was stimulated by the rapid growth of the commercial fleet and an increase in the size of ships. Hundreds of share companies or rederijen were established to finance the construction, purchase, or chartering of vessels and their provisioning for fishing or trading voyages. A rederij, with as many as 64 shares or parten, would usually be set up for a single voyage. Generally, one reder commanded the ship and traded, while the others contributed goods and capital. Shares, which could be sold, bequeathed, and subdivided, were a popular investment, not only among merchants, but also among farmers and artisans. As had been the case earlier in Genoa, the popularity of shipping rederijen declined as marine insurance became widely available in the seventeenth century. But in the Netherlands, too, share-company organization spread to other types of enterprise, including industrial windmills, refineries, breweries, and tile works. Indeed, share finance funded much of the industrial expansion of the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Diversification allowed individual investors to bear the risks of specialized investments, and the easy tradability of shares allowed them to adjust their portfolios as market conditions changed. Share finance was also the basis for the trading companies set up in the late 1590s. These vóórcompagniën were to be combined in 1602 to form the great Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Joint East India Company), to which thousands of shareholders subscribed a total of some 6.5 million florins.
Share companies also appeared in England in the sixteenth century. However, it is not clear whether the English joint stock company was an imitation of Continental forms or whether it evolved from indigenous arrangements. 64 In England, share finance did not originate in shipping: while the practice did exist there, it was uncommon. The first joint stock companies were set up to finance trading ventures (the Russia Company and the Adventurers to Guinie in 1553) and enterprises in mining and metallurgy (the Mines Royal and the Mineral and Battery Works in 1564). Later companies financed privateering and colonization as well as domestic land improvements (enclosures and the draining of the Cambridgeshire fens). 65 The early companies were in effect much like partnerships. Shareholders were relatively few in number, had unlimited liability, and were subject to calls for additional capital. To protect their interests, shareholders had no choice but to involve themselves in the affairs of the company. Although in principle shares were transferable, the nature of the instrument limited its marketability and the 64 Scott (1912) 21 procedure was cumbersome. To the extent shares did trade, it was among relatives and acquaintances rather than among the public at large.
Share companies, like partnerships, determined and distributed their profits through periodic liquidation. Periodic liquidation also provided shareholders with a simple mechanism of control: if they were satisfied with their profits, the enterprise could be reconstituted for an additional voyage or period; if not, they could withdraw their funds. 66 Because there were no institutional mechanisms to protect the interests of shareholders, shares were personal rather than impersonal instruments. Shareholders had no choice but to involve themselves in the affairs of the company to protect their interests. The personal nature of the instrument limited the extent to which shares could trade in a secondary market, since their value was not independent of who owned them.
Although the capital market before 1600 differed in many respects from the capital market of today, it still played a vital role. While its importance in financing commerce was relatively minor, it was essential in financing agriculture, housing, mining, and transportation-sectors that comprised a large part of the economy and that contributed significantly to productivity growth during the period. Moreover, as transoceanic commerce began to require substantial investment in fixed capital after 1600, it too came to rely increasingly on the capital market. In addition, the capital market played a crucial role in public finance. The ability of cities and towns to tap the capital market gave them an important advantage in their struggle with territorial governments, which lacked similar access. And after 1600, gaining access to the capital market became a matter of life and death in the struggle among territorial governments and, implicitly, in the struggle among different forms of government.
